In 1983, the Access and Equity Strategy introduced by the Hawke government, provided bureaucrats with the responsibility in Australia to focus on clients and their rights. This means every Australian taxpayer has a right to access all government services including employment. Migrants after two years of permanent residence are offered citizenships and the right to vote, which leads to their participation and their consequent representation in a democratic Australia. Since the post-war Assimilation Policy for migrants did not mean equality for migrants, the Integrationist Policy replaced this outdated policy in the 1960s. By 1975, migrants began to organize themselves, which culminated in the formation of a unique peak body called Federation of Ethnic Communities' Councils of Australia (FECCA) in 1979, which played a leading role in establishing multiculturalism in Australia. Although there were still pockets of recidivist racism[1] remaining, the majority of Australians believed in the important concept of giving migrants a fair go.[2]
There are many instances of professional migrants not having a fair go in Australia. A study[3] indicates that many “migrant teachers expected to be discriminated against and 30% of them cited racism as a cause for their not being able to find work. It also found that 33% of those, whose qualifications are recognised were denied the first rung of their career in teaching,” in the State of Western Australia. This made them claimed, “deliberate discrimination” by the State Department of Education. The statistics show that only “6% of all teachers employed in the Department are of non-English speaking background and out of 39 respondents who had been found acceptable, only one is in permanent full-time work.”
The victim, a migrant teacher through a 12-year period of an invidious means of discrimination finally became the subject of a blatantly false accusation of the crime of indecent dealing.[4] His case was prognosed in the media[5] as a victim of race-hate who had been irreparably traumatised because of the uncertainties he underwent during his pre-trial period - there was a very real danger of him being convicted for a crime he did not commit at the time.[6] Sad to say, he found that there was no remedy available for him in the West Australian criminal justice system after the night-marish trial and acquittal.[7] The sequel: he was banned in a non-appealable and therefore void administrative decision[8] from working as a teacher.[9] But that situation was only partially redeemed by the incoming Minister for Education who would allow the victim to return to teaching, conditional upon his completing a full year’s service with another employer[10]. The Minister’s hand was tied, as the then Chief Executive Officer of that Department, Mr. Peter Browne, had taken a wrongful[11] decision, which could only be negated in a court of law. Subsequently, as a result of the victim’s court action, there was an elaborate and repeated striking-out process, although the victim was allowed to replead each time. Logically, when a claimant is allowed to re-plead a claim, there could be no real “strikeout” of that claim[12]. Consequently, the costs of the misnamed “strikeout” should not fall on the shoulder of the victim but should have been “costs in the cause”. The purported misapplication of the striking-out principle resulted in what the victim believes to be an erroneous, albeit an aberrant discretionary order of costs by the Supreme Court of Western Australia against the victim. The hapless, tireless victim was helplessly tired-out, and he therefore sought a compromise.[13]
The matter was finally settled and he lost his “right to work” as a consequence of his inability to fight a David-Goliath tussle with a government department.[14]
Multiculturalism is the avowed public policy of the Australian government in recognising and respecting the migrants’ own value system, and the encouraging of their diversities rather than assimilating them into the general population. The government, is moving towards the empowerment and inclusion of migrants into the social fabric of Australian society. Why is reality far different from policy? [15]
This policy is supposed to be managing the consequences of the diversities of the various groups in Australia, in the interests of the individual and society as a whole[16]. It is supposed to be reinforcing the social, cultural and economic benefits of the nation's diversity and ensures that it (multiculturalism) remains a positive force for Australia.[17] The West Australian government expressly allows the coexistence of many cultures, without any one culture dominating the region.[18] It is avowedly making the broadest range of human differences acceptable to the largest number of people and consequently, it is seeking to overcome racism, sexism, and other forms of discrimination.[19] Yet, a department of that government, as described above, is very visible in doing just the opposite.
Employment practices of government
departments, though neutral on their face, can have an “unjustifiably
exclusionary effect on protected groups.[20] This form of discrimination
(disparate impact discrimination doctrine, or indirect discrimination or
adverse impact discrimination), though an American innovation, has remained a
controversial issue in the U.S.[21] It is however, prevalent in the
international scene, wherever there are migrants of diverse ethnicity as this
idea has been favourably received by many Western legal systems;[22] it has “survived very well in the
international marketplace of ideas amongst common-law countries”, inter-alia, Australia.[23]. It refers to an unvalidated (as
opposed to an invalidated) device used by a government department that
disproportionately excludes a protected group (e.g. migrants on account of
their ethnicity or race) unless such a device adopted is job-related.
The conduct of administrators in
government departments, “though fair in form can be discriminatory in
operation”. This is irrespective
whether the discriminatory conduct is intentional or invidiously
motivated. Whenever the administrator
“use testing mechanisms or procedures not connected with measuring job
capability, the absence of discriminatory intent alone will not redeem her
conduct”. Whenever such disparate
impact occurs, it is incumbent upon him to show that such requirements are
“job-related and governed by principles of business necessity.”[24] This indirect discrimination is
logically extended from the concept of unfair exclusion of migrants. Whether or
not such exclusion of migrants is wrongful, could be surmised from the facts
available in each circumstance:
§ Whether the current unintended
exclusion of migrant groups (when compared with the prevailing historical
circumstances affecting their exclusion as a protected group) is a current
reflection of a deliberate discriminatory policy of the government.
§ Whether forces of necessity could
understandably justify the current unintended exclusion of the protected
migrant groups.
As a corollary, it can be said that
where migrant groups are excluded - unintentionally - and there are no logical
explanations for them; it then becomes clear that the bureaucrats had, through
deliberate and elaborate planning processes had caused and are responsible for
a reprehensible wastage of human resources, which are ever present in our
nation; such resources could be
derived from a ready pool of
professional migrants who are highly skilled in their respective areas of
expertise and are specially selected for their skills as migrants into
Australia.
In Australia, anti-discrimination
laws (including those affecting indirect discrimination) were passed at both
the state and federal level since the mid-1970s. They were modelled after those
of the U.K. The notion of indirect discrimination, however, was not embraced in
all Australian jurisdictions as it was only included belatedly in bills or
amendments as a result of intensive lobbying from women's organizations and
administrative agencies.[25]
Now, all Australian legislatures have incorporated the notion of
indirect discrimination into their anti-discrimination laws. In some, only simplified definitions have
been enacted, but in others, broad definitions of discrimination including both
disparate treatment (direct discrimination) and disparate impact (indirect
discrimination) have been implemented.[26]
Both of Australia's Racial
Discrimination Act, 1975 (Cth) and Sex Discrimination Act, 1984, (Cth.)
were specifically enacted in order to implement Australia's obligations under
the Race Convention and Women's Convention.[27]
The theory in Griggs referred to below about disparate impact
discrimination was incorporated into them and this idea has now become a
legitimate definition of discrimination, which is now beyond challenge in
Western Europe and internationally. The
Australian Constitution drafted in the 1890s, is clearly deficient in anti-discrimination ideas
as it was drafted in a then prevailing legal-philosophical climate of arid
positivism. Effectually, it does not
contain a Bill of Rights.
Moreover, attempts in the 1970s and 1980s to amend it to include more
extensive rights-guarantees had failed.[28] Anti-discrimination legislation in
the Australian States and Territories now prohibit discrimination on a wide
variety of grounds, including race, ethnicity, sex, disability, age, religious
belief, and sexual orientation. The structure of the legislation is such that
the concept of indirect or adverse effect discrimination applies equally to all
grounds, without distinction.
In Australian Iron & Steel
Pty. Ltd. v. Banovic,[29] the High Court held that the
"last hired, first fired" criterion had a disparate impact on women
employees in that it was unreasonable because its operation serves to
perpetuate the effects of the company's past discrimination against women. The
plaintiffs were given “constructive seniority” in service for future purposes and
awarded a total sum of damages in excess of $A1 million.[30]
It may thus be imputed that the “seniority systems” of a government department that
have a disparate impact on protected groups of employees like migrants - who have
many years of experience overseas - are open to challenge whether such
disparate impact arises as a result of past discrimination or current
exclusions.
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., recognized devices adopted by a government department that are
developed with only a dominant group in mind are likely to have an exclusionary
effect on migrants who do not share the characteristics of the dominant group.
Thus, facially neutral practices of a government department, far from being
protected from scrutiny, should be subject to examination for possible
disparate effects. Only in this way will anti-discrimination legislation be
able to tackle the full range of discrimination that exists. This point is
given serious attention by our Australian legal systems. Australia unlike the
United States together with an “impressive array of foreign and
international legal institutions” have concluded that Griggs is not folly. Disparate impact theory is widely
accepted as a crucial element in Australia in providing substance to “statutory, constitutional, and international promises of equality.”[31]
Migrants who are denied their right
to work are effectively being “denied their citizenship rights as
surely as they are denied the right of free speech and the right to vote.” If this right to work is not made
a human right for migrants, then that portion of the Australian polity will be
permanently excluded from the effective economic participation in the
community.[32]
There should therefore be a statutory right to work in Australia and
locally the State of Western Australia should be bearing the responsibility of
its implementation. Citizens’ access to work should not be made conditional so
that full employment in the economy could be achieved, thus guaranteeing price
stability for consumers.[33]
Employment, a fundamental human
right can be established either as a natural right or through a “pragmatic, instrumentalist approach” by using factual experience and analysis of
outcomes derived from those experiences[34].
The Universal Declaration of
Human Rights does include, inter alia, the right to work. Both the United Nations and the International Labour
Office have
ratified the right to work with the 1946 ILO Declaration of Philadelphia asserting
full employment as a national and international goal.[35] The right to work has gone only as
far as being replicated in international legal instruments.[36] Many countries are either unwilling
or unable to mandate such a right or codify and enforce any human rights for
citizens.[37]
So the right to work is a “non core right” that should be left to individual
countries to enforce or to be interpreted in the context of rights of work.[38], Article 6 of the ILO incorporates the right to work, in
the context only of the right of those in employment. Yet, in most
industrialised countries there is no legislation on the right to work[39]. Employment rights seem to be
narrowly interpreted as encompassing the rights of those in employment and
excluding any rights for those who are unemployed.
Work should be regarded as a right
because labour income is the staple of the majority of households; and without
it, their involvement in a market economy is minimized. Access to income also
governs access to other rights, including minimum requirements of clothing,
food and housing.
A right to work means those who wish
to do so should be able to obtain paid full-time (or fractional) employment.
This guarantee of a right to work should be made by the State and it should be
legally enforceable in much the same way as other rights. It should not be
confined to any work designated by the State. Those exercising their right to
work should be given options as to the type of employment they wish to take up.
They should be paid minimum adult rates of pay and be accorded the same rights
and conditions associated with full-time market employment (or pro rata)
-- holiday and sickness benefits, a safe workplace, protection against unfair
dismissal. They should they be employed for as long as they wish while
satisfying the standard conditions of employment. Those exercising this right
could regard guaranteed jobs as a temporary step towards higher paid employment
in the market sector.
To neglect either national or
international consideration of the right to work enables unemployment to
flourish across the globe. The ILO recently renewed international commitment to
full employment to reverse the poverty, unemployment and underemployment now
prevailing in so many parts of the globe[40] The OECD recent recommendations
excluded any consideration of a right to work.[41] A right to work is the precondition
for eliminating unemployment and its enormous costs and consequences. However,
it is clear that such a right will not be accorded the status of an
internationally enforceable obligation. However, if the right is enshrined in
Australian law this will mean that governments will be legislatively forced to
redress the issue of unemployment. Thus the federal government will be obliged
to develop and implement a full and effective employment policy.
Unemployment amongst migrants is
either due to their voluntary choice or the rigid structure of the West
Australian economy and labour markets.[42]
Thus unemployment problems for migrants could be resolved if “minimum
wages were abolished, industrial relations deregulated, benefit assistance
tightened and the size of the government sector reduced.”[43]
Unemployment for migrants has
ramifications on their families and their communities. Their families may break
up, there may be alienation of their family members; discrimination, illness or
death, substance abuse, truancy and non-completion of schooling, and poverty
may also result.[44] The costs associated with
unemployment of migrants are “the loss of their current output and
the associated fiscal burden, the loss of their freedom and consequent social
exclusion, their skill loss and long-run damage, their psychological harm, ill
health and mortality, their motivational loss and future work, their loss of
human relations and family life, their racial and gender inequality, loss of
social values and responsibility, and organisational inflexibility and
technical conservatism.”[45] Additionally, migrants could be
involved in petty crime, ghettoisation and inherit unemployment and poverty
from their parents. Their social and
economic exclusion facilitates their anti social behaviour and fosters the
growth of illegal activities as a means of generating income.[46]
If a government department administrator by representations of words or conduct led migrants to believe in a certain state of affairs, it is precluded by the rule of evidence of promissory estoppel from denying the truth of such assertions. This is especially so if the migrants had changed their positions in reliance[47] upon such representations to their detriment.[48]
When the administrator stood by and kept silence when she observed migrants labouring under a mistake of fact; when it could have spoken out in time to prevent such a misapprehension or mistake from occurring; such omissions or commissions could result in migrants relying on the doctrine of equitable estoppel to bring about a claim against that government department. Even so, the government department may still resile from its promise on giving reasonable notice so that the migrant could get a reasonable opportunity of resuming his former position by refusing to migrate. However, that promise only becomes final and irrevocable if the migrant can no longer resume his former position.
The government employer should not punish its employee twice for any infringement of its rules: Nemo debet bis puniri pro uno delictor. It must exercise its statutory powers honestly and in good faith, fairly and not capriciously, and it cannot exclude judicial review of proceedings that is founded on fraud.
When acting as a tribunal and arriving at a manifestly unreasonable decision it may not necessarily have exceeded its jurisdiction but it may be held to have done so if the unreasonableness is a consequence of its having taking irrelevant considerations into account, failing to have regard to relevant considerations or addressing itself to and answering the wrong questions. Similarly, a decision reached without any supporting evidence at all is not per se outside its jurisdiction but it may be so characterised for the same reasons. The decision made by the administrator of a government department must be based on evidence having probative value[49] The courts will not necessarily be ready to measure every administrative act by a yardstick of reasonableness. It must observe rules for fair adjudication. For instance, he shall not be a judge in his own cause nor condemn a migrant employee unheard and must always give reasons for his decisions. Prima facie, a duty to act judicially[50] will arise in the exercise of a power to deprive the employee of his livelihood.[51] Professional migrants have a legitimate interest and expectation to be employed[52] and if they are refused employment, the government employer must be prepared to give them a hearing and provide reasons for their refusal. It must give fair consideration to the facts and must consider representation made by persons directly concerned with the matter. Its hearing must be conducted openly, fairly and impartially and fairness means abstention from abuse of discretion. It has a duty and an obligation not to capriciously, arbitrarily and unreasonably deprive the migrant of his common law right to work in his chosen profession.[53] (This common law “right to work” is well-received into Australia.[54]) Its decision must not be suggestive of any prejudgment of the issues.[55] Professional tribunals should not condemn on a balance of probabilities[56] but is duty bound to prove a case on the criminal standard of proof.
Employees are not required to do what is impossible and therefore cannot be penalized for not carrying out their duties faithfully when the task assigned to them is rendered impossible by design: Nemo tenetur ad impossible. Administrators taking decisions shall not have any pecuniary or personal interest in the case she tries. Nor must he depart from standards of even-handed justice[57] required of administrators who holds judicial or quasi-judicial office. She must not be placed in situations where there is a likelihood of bias nor must he decide on issues where she has already indicated partisanship by expressing opinions. Migrant employees have a right to work as a proprietary right[58] without being arbitrarily and unreasonably excluded by anyone having the governance of it. It shall not make a policy, which enables it to reject migrants’ employment, arbitrarily or capriciously and not reasonably, as that rule is bad and against public policy[59].
For litigant-migrants to make a successful claim, they need to discharge their burden of proof. There are two burdens of proof[60], which vary at any one time in the different stages of the trial. The legal burden remains constant throughout the trial. The incidence of the legal burden on different issues may lie in different places at different times in the trial and issues may rise or fall according to the facts proved.[61] The claimants will have to establish facts supporting their arguments and at the conclusion of the trial, if they fail to discharge this burden to the appropriate standard usually on a balance of probability in a civil case, they would have failed in the action.[62] This burden is usually clear from the pleadings. The golden rule is that the burden of proof always falls upon the one who asserts the truth of particular facts. [63]
The evidential burden may shift from one
party to another as the trial progresses according to the balance of evidence
given at any particular stage of the trial.[64] This burden rests upon the party who would
fail if no evidence were given at all.
The burden will initially rest upon the claimant bearing the legal
burden but as the weight of evidence by either side during the trial varies, so
will the evidential burden shift to the party who would fail without further
evidence.[65]
Where the truth of a claimant’s allegation lies peculiarly within the knowledge of the government department, the burden of disproving it, often lies upon the latter.[66] However, the incidence of the burden of proof may be determined by agreement between the parties in civil cases.[67]
Right to work and contractual nexus:
There need be no contractual nexus between the migrant and a government department for enforcing a common law “right to work” [68]. This principle is founded in the English case of Nagle v Fielden, referred to above. Lord Reid in another English case [69] said that in any dismissal from an office, though casual or temporary, there must be something to warrant the employee’s dismissal.[70]
The audi alteram partem rule is applicable where migrants are deprived of membership of a professional or social body according to an English principle of law regarding natural justice[71]. Where an equivalent situation exists in Australia where professional migrants are being denied of their right to work, Jessel M.R. could not be very far from the truth when he reiterates that natural justice as it then existed in the 18th century is still alive today, and it requires the aggrieved migrant professional be heard.[72]
The most fundamental of fiduciary relationships in our society is that which exists between the community (the people) and the State and its agencies[73]. In Australia, a line of decisions beginning in 1875[74] and reaching the High Court, have affirmed the nature of the fiduciary who is the public officer of a government department or one who has the status of a member of parliament.[75] Thus, the State Government of Western Australia itself is recognised as a trust for the West Australians.[76] As a corollary, the fiduciary relationship existing amongst partners is akin to the relationship that exists between an administrator of a government department and a migrant professional employee of that department. They respectively owe each other mutual obligations of trust and confidence between themselves similar to the relations between partners. Each employee/employer is an agent and at the same time, a principal for the other.
There are six categories of circumstances where one party is a fiduciary and the other a beneficiary but the respective roles of the parties in the fiduciary/beneficiary relationship may be reversed. This reversal of role depends on the circumstances of the particular case. However, this list of fiduciary relationships is non-exhaustive.[77] A professional migrant employee of a government department is admitted as a fiduciary when performing his duties as an employee. However his employer could also play the role of a fiduciary, as it is keeper of the public trust for the Australian polity, if it uses employment practices and policies, which are clearly discriminatory. They are public officials working as agents for a government department and holding public property in trust for the people and as such could be charged with corruption[78] as well as being subject to civil action for the recovery of gains made in breach of their public trusteeship.[79]
As said earlier, the courts have on numerous occasions stated that the categories of fiduciary relationships are not closed. In Australia the fiduciary principle can still be seen as a proscriptive principle. This means it does not import a connotation of positive duties on the part of the fiduciary to the beneficiary but rather is concerned with the maintenance of loyalty and the fiduciary principle is activated whenever a fiduciary seeks improperly to advance his own interests or the interests of others he chose to favor, in or as a result of the relationship. To be denoted a fiduciary; a migrant employee, whether in his capacity as a corporate body or as Member of Parliament, is thus exposed to the full range of equitable rules that are associated with that position. Shepherd[80] notes that the duty of loyalty is the essence of the fiduciary relationship between its citizen and the State.[81]
The process of finding the existence of a fiduciary relationship is the process of finding the existence of a duty of loyalty owed by one person to another. The administrator owes professional migrants a duty of loyalty that, as a member of the West Australian community, they should be treated alike, like any other member of the community, irrespective of whether they are migrant-professionals or locally-born citizens of this State.
The WA State Supreme Court is a superior court with unlimited jurisdictions. It has an original jurisdiction to hear all civil and criminal cases. A judge of that Court may scrutinize and review through a branch of the constitutional law called the administrative law the functions and decisions made by administrators of the departments and agencies of the State government. The concept of ministerial responsibility of the government department requires that every action of a public servant be the action of the Minister and the Minister is therefore responsible to Parliament for the conduct of that Minister’s department. This proposition forms the basis of the review of administrative decisions and that each review be carried out in accordance with administrative law, which is that body of principles and rules that state and govern the functions and powers of all those public servants and agencies of government. This branch of the law deals with the judicial and extra-judicial review of the actions of administrative authorities[82].
By judicial review of an administrative action, a court reviews the legal propriety of the actions of the executive. It is concerned to establish whether correct procedures were followed and whether the law was correctly interpreted and applied. Despite its inadequacy, judicial review may indirectly allow the merits of decision to be reviewed on the grounds of[83]:
§ “Unreasonableness” - to render a decision ultra virus in being so unreasonable that no reasonable person could be expected to have taken it;
§ Regard to irrelevant considerations or no regard to relevant considerations. The burden is on the administrative decision maker to show that the decision was based on relevant considerations.[84]
Migrants working in a government
department expect various types of organizational justice that may affect their
attitudes towards their employers and their behaviours in the workplace:
§
Distributive
justice focuses on the perceived fairness or equity as the relevant standard by
which fairness is determined by migrant professionals of outcomes.[86]
This means that employees, who are migrant professionals, ought to
receive outcomes consistent with the quantity and quality of results they
produce through their performance.
Effectively this means that the first employee terminated in a layoff
should be the lowest performers.
Whenever migrants perceive that this internal standard had been
violated, the result is low distributive justice. They may therefore respond to it by showing anti-social
behaviours like employee theft and sabotage.
In order to restore their sense of equity they may resort to
discrimination claiming and other antisocial behaviours.
§
Procedural
justice[87] focuses on the perceived fairness
of the procedures used to determine outcomes by migrant professionals and the
implementation of these procedures by the department.[88] Migrant employees are more willing
to accept the unfavourable outcomes if they believe the procedures that
resulted in the unfavourable outcome were fair. Employees value procedural
justice as a social norm because it is considered as morally appropriate. A violation of such norm is considered
subversion and could therefore be procedurally unjust. Such unfair treatment
may result in revenge episodes.
§
Voice
justice posits that migrant employees value the opportunity to have their
opinions and positions heard within an organization. Conversely, any procedures
that deny voice justice were viewed as procedurally unfair.
The General Conference of
the International Labour Organization,[89]
considered the Declaration of Philadelphia, which affirmed that all human
beings, irrespective of race, creed or sex, have the right to pursue both their
material well-being and their spiritual development in conditions of freedom
and dignity, of economic security and equal opportunity. [90] It considered that discrimination
is a violation of rights under the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights.
It defines discrimination as:
§
Any distinction,
exclusion or preference made on the basis of race, colour, sex, religion,
political opinion, national extraction or social origin, which has the effect
of nullifying or impairing equality of opportunity or treatment in employment
or occupation;
§
Such
other distinction, exclusion or preference which has the effect of nullifying
or impairing equality of opportunity or treatment in employment or occupation
as may be determined by the Member concerned after consultation with
representative employers' and workers' organizations, where such exist, and
with other appropriate bodies.”[91]
It is not discrimination if any
distinction, exclusion or preference in respect of a particular job is based on
the inherent requirements of the particular job. Employment and occupation include access to vocational training,
employment and particular occupations and terms and conditions of employment.
The signatory countries undertake to impose a national policy for the purpose
of promoting appropriate methods of equality of opportunity and treatment in
employment and occupation, so as to eliminate any form of discrimination.
Further, they undertake to seek the co-operation of employers’ and workers’
organizations to accept and observe this policy, to enact legislation and
promote educational programs for this purpose. It is not a discriminatory
practice to make measures against anyone suspected of engaging in activities,
which are prejudicial to the security of the State. Special measures designed to provide special assistance or
protection to meet particular requirements of persons for reasons such as sex,
age, disablement, family responsibilities or cultural status are not deemed to
be discrimination.
The policy makers and legislators in all countries with ethnic minority or migrant populations including Australia should be guided[92] to develop affirmative action programs so as to actively promote migrants equal participation in the labour force. The International Labour Organization (ILO) is constitutionally obliged to protect the 'interests of workers when employed in countries other than their own'[93]. Traditionally, this has been done through the elaboration, adoption and supervision on international labour standards,[94] and in this way they change not only legislation but the actual practices as well. The ILO standards concerning migrant workers are their non-discrimination or equality of opportunity and treatment. Many countries broadly observe this objective in the economic and social spheres. Others ratify the ILO Conventions or standards[95] and tried their best to fulfil the obligations derived from it. Contrary to expectations, discrimination still exists in these countries at workplaces in private or public enterprises. In response to this, ILO has a global program to combat discrimination against migrant workers and ethnic minorities by informing policy makers, employers, workers and trainers on how legislative measures and training activities can be made more effective. The program covers empirical verification of discrimination, research to assess the scope and efficacy of legislative measures to combat discrimination, research to evaluate training and education in anti-discrimination or equal treatment and seminars to disseminate and draw conclusions on research findings. Despite this, the phenomenon of discrimination in access to employment is assuming alarming proportions in many countries, for example in Netherlands.[96]
In the context of Western Australia, the current government should surely and certainly take protective and special measures[97] to ensure that migrants are not disadvantaged. The protective measures “recognize the distinct cultural characteristics of particular racial or ethnic groups so that they can participate fully in the society in which they live.” These may consist of “ … the maintenance of language and culture - may constitute legitimate differential treatment and therefore be non-discriminatory.”
The special measures “… taken for the sole purpose of securing the adequate advancement of certain racial or ethnic groups in order to ensure that such groups can enjoy or exercise their human rights in a manner equal to the rest of society.” They include 'catch up' measures to address “… to a level comparable to the rest of Australian society. Such measures are not considered discriminatory so long as they do not lead to the maintenance of separate rights for different racial groups and do not continue once the objectives of the special measure have been achieved.”
<End of Document>
(This
essay contains 5,474 words excluding title, headings and foot-notes)
[[1]]
See for example:: Paul Lampathakis: Pupils get race-hate packs: The West
Australian, Thursday, April, 8, 1999 at p.5. (An account of race-hate
attacks against Asians in a West Australian State school)
[[2]]
Bolkus, Nick, Senator; Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, Australia: Political
Aspects of Diversity - Social Justice in a Changing Australia (1995) Global
Cultural Diversity Conference Proceedings, Sydney <http://www.immi.gov.au/multicultural/confer/speech25a.htm>
[[3]]
Dunworth, K., supported by Nunn, K, : A
Report Commissioned by Curtin University of technology and the Overseas
Qualifications Unit of the Western Australian Department of Training: An
Investigation into a Hidden Asset: A
study of Overseas Trained NESB Teachers in WA (October, 1996), The Centre
for International English, Curtin University.
[[4]]
Norman Aisbett: An Odious
allegation: When a 10-year old girl made allegations of abuse, a 28-year
teaching career came to an abrupt halt.
And being found innocent by a court was not enough to repair a tarnished
reputation: The Big Weekend: West Australian, Saturday, May, 30, 1998 at
p.4.
See also:
Conway, Ronald: Perjury can be child’s play: When allegations of
child sexual abuse are flying, it is not always clear just who are the victims:
The Australian: April, 27.1995.
See also: Duhaimie’s Law Dictionary: L334 website for editors:: “Truth and
falsehood, it has been well said, are not always opposed to each other like
black and white, but oftentimes, and by design, are made to resemble each other
so as to be hardly distinguishable; just as the counterfeit.” Quoted from Johnson
v. Emerson – Murdoch University Electronic Journal of Law
[[5]]
Norman Aisbett: Teacher claims sex case frame-up: The West Australian,
Wednesday, February 8, 1995 at p.42.
[[6]]
Findlay, M, Odgers, S., and Yeo, S. (1999): Australian Criminal Justice
(2nd Edition); Oxford University Press, Melbourne, which said: “In Western
Australia, the proof demanded of the prosecution is the lighter civil standard
of a balance of probabilities …”citing Xiao (1989) 40 A Crim. R 468. Cf.
Aloia [1983] WAR 133 at p.244).
This means that the criminal prosecution of cases where the relevant
statute (the Criminal Code of each State or Territory) does not prescribe
specifically for intention or mens rea as an element of the crime, (as is the case with the crime of indecent
dealing) the standard of proof required under the law is only the civil
standard. Unlike the Woolmington
principle which applies to New South Wales and South Australia, which requires
the prosecution to prove the facts asserted by it, or to disprove a defence
claim, beyond a reasonable doubt. {See Saffron (1988) 39 A Crim R 123; Law
v Deed [1970] SASR 374. The West
Australian Criminal Code though seen as a potential threat of deterrence to
the small-time criminal, can, on the other hand, be a liberty-depriving statute
as it is quite a lethal weapon for those who wield it for the purpose of
race-hate gratification etc.
See also: Criminal Code Act Compilation Act, 1913
(WA):
1)The third limb of s.23 provides that intention as
element of a crime need not be proved by the prosecution, unless expressly
provided for. It reads: Unless
otherwise expressly declared, the motive by which a person is induced to do or
omit to do an act, or to form an intention, is immaterial so far as regards
criminal responsibility.
2)s.279(1) which expressly provides for intention or
mens rea as a element of the crime of murder:
“If the offender intends to do to the person killed
or to some other person some grievous bodily harm…”
3)s. 323 which provides that a person who unlawfully
and indecently assaults another person is guilty of a crime and liable to
imprisonment for 5 years. Summary
conviction: Imprisonment for 2 years or a fine of $8,000.
[[7]]
Watts, Kristen : Teacher fails in action against Student: The West
Australian: Friday, May 15, 1998.
See also:
Barrass, Tony; Peach, Bronwyn: Judge
Bean Waxes Lyrical: Justice Chris Steytler talking about defamation to the
Environment Defenders’ Office quoting the American judge: Roy Bean: Inside
Cover: The West Australian: June, 20, 1998 at p.2.
Watts, Kristen: Teacher Told DPP Will Block Bid
to Prosecute: The West Australian:
Tuesday, May 19, 1998 at p.7.
[[8]]
Carpenter, Alan J; Shadow Minister of Education; Letter: (March, 28th, 2000);
and letter: Ryan, John: Staffing Director, Education Department of Western Australia (June. 11th,
1999). The former Minister of Education,
Mr. Barnett asserted that the victim had exhausted all avenues of appeal, and
had accordingly informed the present Minister for Education Mr. Carpenter. This is a clear contradiction in Mr. Ryan’s
letter that the decision taken against the victim by the CEO was not
appealable. Neither was reasons given
for the banning decision.
[[9]]
This victim of race-hate, being already assessed and accepted by the Education
Department of Western Australia as a satisfactory teacher, was subjected to
further harassing assessments when there are clear indicators at the
school-level that the assessors were not going to be fair to migrant teachers
because of the widespread fear of economic competition from migrants.
Master Bredmeyer of the W.A. Supreme Court struck
out Civil Action No.1032 of 2000 filed on 28th July, 2000 by this victim
against the West Australian Department of Education for libel and sought other
declaratory reliefs for his right to work as a teacher . Consequently, the
victim was ordered to pay costs.
See also a report by Roy Gibson: Teacher’s bias
claim fails in Court in the West Australian, December, 28, 2000 at p. 29.
See also:
letter by victim, (who with Hobson’s choice was forced to settle the
matter upon terms imposed by the Crown Solicitor): January, 8th, 2001;
See also: Memorandum
of Consent Orders (signed by the
victim) as per O.46 r. 16 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1971 (WA).
See also: Chin, Nicholas: letters to Mr. Peter
Quinlan, Solicitor for the Crown Solicitor’s Office (dated December, 17th, 2000
and January, 4th, 2001) and replies thereto (December, 19th 2000 and January,
5th, 2001).
[[10]]
Carpenter, Alan J, MLA, Minister for Education for WA: Letter (16th March, 2001): The victim had
taught successfully for 11 years in West Australian State schools and for a
period of another 22 years in Malaysian state schools as a permanent teacher.
The victim sees this as belated condition imposed unfairly and inequitably upon
the victim and is thus another farcical attempt to get rid of this economic
competitor, in the former Minister for Education, Mr. Colin J Barnett’s
perceived efforts to pander to the “wishes” of the community at the expense of
migrant professionals as a protected group.
[[11]] A wrongful administrative decision because the victim was condemned unheard, no reason was given for the decision and the decision was not cannot be appealed against.
[[12]]
Hubbuck & sons Ltd v Wilklinson, Heywood and Clark Ltd ([1899} 1QB 86 at
94: If the pleading cannot be cured by amendment, the court will strike it out.
See also: Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4th ed., Vol.36, Para. 73 at p.57: If the action is not maintable or that an
absolute defence exists, the court will strike it out. A pleading will not, however, be struck out
if it is merely demurrable.
(Demurrable means capable of being responded to by the Defendant who does not dispute the
truth of the Plaintiff’s action: Merryan-Collegiate Dictionary of the
Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1999, CD-ROM.)
[[13]]
Quinlan, Peter, Crown Solicitors’ Office: Letter (19th December,
2000) counter-offering on following terms by way of mutual consent:
a) Action be dismissed and judgment entered for the
Defendant.
b) There be no order as to costs.
[[14]]
Chin, Nicholas: Letter (8th January,
2001) to Mr Peter Quinlan, Solicitor, Crown Solicitor’s Office and Memorandum
of Consent Orders: signed by the victim in accordance with the terms first
offered by Crown Solicitor on behalf of the Education Department of Western
Australia (17th, December , 2000).
[[15]]
See Footnote No.3: Ibid at p.33 above: The government of Western Australia,
does appreciate and admits in the context of its educational policy - in that
if our school children were presented with positive images of competent
professionals from different backgrounds; would it not be that Australia could
be taking one more step towards the creation of a truly multicultural society?
[[16]]
Australian Multiculturalism for a new century: Towards Inclusiveness, (NNMAC Report) launched by Prime Minister, John Howard, (May 5, 1999): 32 recommendations were made to improve and refocus multicultural
policy. In response, the Australian Government produced its multicultural
policy statement: A New Agenda for Multicultural Australia, in
Parliament on December 9, 1999.
[[17]]
The New Agenda emphasizes that multicultural policies should be built on
Australia's democratic system, with the following core principles, to ensure
that multicultural Australia flourishes for all Australians:
§
Civic duty -
all Australians to support basic structures and principles which guarantee us
our freedom and equality and enable diversity to flourish;
§
Cultural
respect - all Australians’ right to express their own culture and beliefs and
obliges them to accept the right of others to do the same;
§
Social equity -
all Australians entitled to equality of treatment and opportunity so that they
are able to contribute to the social, political and economic life of Australia,
free from discrimination, including on the grounds of race, culture, religion,
language, location, gender or place of birth; and
§
Productive
diversity - maximizes for all Australians the significant cultural, social and
economic dividends arising from the diversity of our population.
[[18]]
Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (DIMA) Fact Sheet No.8:
The Evolution of Australia's Multicultural Policies: July, 2000.
[[19]]
Australia’s international reputation is that it is a racially tolerant and
culturally diverse society. Reaffirmation of Australia’s commitment to racial
tolerance on October, 30, 1996 when Prime Minister John Howard, moved a
Parliamentary Statement on Racial Tolerance, in the Australian Parliament's
House of Representatives which read:
"That this House:
§
Reaffirms its
commitment to the right of all Australians to enjoy equal rights and be treated
with equal respect regardless of race, co lour, creed or origin;
§
Reaffirms its
commitment to maintaining an immigration policy wholly non-discriminatory on
grounds of race, co lour creed or origin;
§
Reaffirms its
commitment to the process of reconciliation with Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander people, in the context of redressing their profound social and
economic disadvantage;
§
Reaffirms its
commitment to maintain Australia as a culturally diverse, tolerant and open
society, united by an overriding commitment to our nation, and its democratic
institutions and values; and
§
Denounces
racial intolerance in any form as incompatible with the kind of society we are
and want to be.”
This Statement was supported by the Opposition Leader,
Kim Beazley, and carried unanimously.
[[20]]
See Griggs v Duke Power Co 401 U.S. 424 (1971) .
See also: Hunter, Rosemary C; Shoben, Elaine, V: Disparate
impact discrimination: American oddity or internationally accepted concept?
(Summer 1998 v19 n1) Berkeley Journal of Employment and Labor Law, at p.
108-152.
<http://infotrac.galegroup.com/menu></itw/infomark/703/44/15787345w6/13!ret_lib_1>
[[21]]
This doctrine is attacked in the U.S:
§
As a mandate
for preferential treatment (See Paul D. Moreno, From Direct Action to
Affirmative Action 279-82 (1997));
§
As an
unwarranted governmental restraint on contractual freedom (See Richard A.
Epstein, Forbidden Grounds: The Case Against Employment Discrimination Laws
197 (1992);
§
As a
wrongheaded attempt at common sense (See Richard J. Herrnstein & Charles
Murray, The Bell Curve: Intelligence and Class Structure in American Life
(1994) and;
§
As a “folly”
(See generally Michael E. Gold, Griggs' Folly: An Essay on the Theory
Problems, and Origin of the Adverse Impact Definition of Employment
Discrimination and a Recommendation for Reform, 7 Indus. Rel. L.J. 429,
587-88 (1985).
[[23]]
Examples of legislation in Australia which incorporates the disparate
discrimination doctrine, include:
Disability Discrimination Act. 1992, s.6
(Cth.);
Anti-discrimination Act, 1977, ss.7(1)(c),
24(1)(b), 39(1)(b), 49B(1)(b), 49ZG(1)(b), 49ZYA(1)(b) (N.S.W.);
Anti-Discrimination Act, 1991, s. 11 (Qld.);
Equal Opportunity Act, 1984. ss. 29(2)(b),
29(3)(b), 29(5)(b), 29(6)(b), 51 (b), 66(b), 85a(b) (S.A.);
Equal Opportunity Act, 1995. s.9 (Vic.);
Equal Opportunity Act, 1984, ss.8(2), 9(2),
10(2). 35A(2), 36(2), 53(2), 66A(3), 66V(3) (W. A.).
These various provisions may be synthesized as
follows:
A discriminator discriminates against an aggrieved
person on the ground of the aggrieved person's [status], if the discriminator
requires the aggrieved person to comply with a requirement or condition:
With which a substantially higher proportion of
persons of a different [status] comply or are able to comply; and
Which is not reasonable having regard to the
circumstances of the case; and with which the aggrieved person does not or is
not able to comply.
Discrimination Act, 1991, s.8 (A.C.T.);
Sex Discrimination Act, 1984, ss.5(2), 6(2).
7(2), 7B(1), 7C (Cth.);
Section 5(2) of the Sex Discrimination Act
(Cth.) provides that:
For the purposes of this Act, a person (the
"discriminator") discriminates against another person (the
"aggrieved person") on the ground of the sex of the aggrieved person
if the discriminator imposes, or proposes to impose, a condition, requirement
or practice that has, or is likely to have.. the effect of d
isadvantaging persons of the same sex as the
aggrieved person....
Section 7B(1) of the Act states further:
A person does not discriminate against another
person ... [in the terms of] subsection 5(2)... if the condition, requirement
or practice is reasonable in the circumstances.
See also: Sex Discrimination Act. 1994, s.15
(Tas.).
Anti-Discrimination Act, 1992, s.20(1)
(N.T.);
Racial Discrimination Act, 1975, s.9(1)
(Cth.); but cf. Racial Discrimination Act, 1975, s.9(1A) (Cth.)
(closer to the provisions mentioned above.)
1) Anti-Discrimination Act, 1992, s.20(1)
(N.T.);
2) Racial Discrimination Act, 1975, s.9(1)
(Cth.); but cf. Racial Discrimination Act, 1975, s.9(1A) (Cth.)
[[27]]
For the role of the Race Convention in The Racial Discrimination Act,
see: Gerhardy v. Brown (1985) 159 C.L.R. 70; Koowarta v.
Bjelke-Peterson (1982) 153 C.L.R. 168. The relationship between the Women's
Convention and the Sex Discrimination Act is spelled out in ss.9 (10) and
11(3) of the Act.
See also: Aldridge v. Booth (1988) 80 A.L.R.
1.
[[28]]
See: Charlesworth, Hilary: The Australian Reluctance About Rights, 31
Osgoode Hall L.J. 195 (1993): It does,
however, have a limited list of guarantees of freedom and non-discrimination.
For example, section 92 prescribes absolute freedom of interstate trade and
commerce. S.80 provides that the trial on indictment of any offence against any
law of the Commonwealth shall be by jury, and every such trial shall be held in
the State where the offence was committed, and if the offence was not committed
within any State the trial shall be held at such place or places as the
Parliament prescribes. This and other
prohibitions against economic discrimination were included in keeping with one
of the aims of Australian federation, to create a free trade zone within the
country. S.116, guarantees religious freedom, and s. 117, provides: "A
subject of the Queen, resident in any State, shall not be subject in any other
State to any disability or discrimination which would not be equally applicable
to him if he were a subject of the Queen resident in such other State."
[[29]]
(1989) 168 C.L.R. 165 aff'g Najdovska v. Australian Iron & Steel Pty Ltd
(1985) E.O.C. 192-140; Najdovska v. Australian Iron & Steel Pty Ltd (1986)
E.O.C. A leading Australian indirect discrimination case, and one of only two
indirect discrimination cases to have reached the High Court of Australia. This case is about the use of a “seniority
system to determine layoffs. For many years, the Australian Iron & Steel
with its steelworks at Port Kembla in New South Wales had virtually refused to
employ women, leaving them on waiting lists for years while men were generally
employed within a few weeks of application. As a result of sex discrimination
complaints, a number of women were hired in 1981. Towards the end of 1982, the
company announced a program of layoffs on the basis of "last hired, first
fired." Many of the women recently hired were now laid off because of
their low seniority. The men who had applied for employment at the same time as
the women retained their positions because they had sufficient seniority to
resist retrenchment.” [Paragraph] 92-176 (decision on damages).
[[30]]
See Najdovska v. Australian Iron & Steel Pty Ltd (1986) E.O.C.
192-176 (decision on damages), modified by Australian Iron & Steel v.
Najdovska (1988) 12 N.S.W. L. R. 587.
[[32]]
Burgess, John; Mitchell, William F., Unemployment, Human Rights and a Full
Employment Policy in Australia: Australian Journal of Human Rights, (Vol.4
No.2) at p.424.
<http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/ahric/ajhr/V4N2/ajhr424.html>.
(Centre for Full Employment and Living Standards, Department
of Economics University of Newcastle)
[[33]]
Siegel R. L.: Employment and Human Rights: the International Dimension
(University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia 1994) Ch 1: The concept of the
right to work has been around for some 300 years and currently the United
Nations and the International Labour Organization have been grappling with its
definition.
[[34]]
Tool M "Employment as a Human Right", paper presented to the European
Association for Evolutionary Political Economy (Antwerp, November, 1997) p
6:
"The doctrine of natural rights is ... not a
theory, not an attempted description or ordering of the facts, but a faith, the
essential dogmatic basis of what Carl Becker has called the `heavenly city' of
the eighteenth century."
Natural right relies on faith to motivate the
conclusions:
"It is a function not of causal demonstration
but of antecedent reverential belief. It embodies and recommends a value
premise that must be accepted prior to inquiry and is validated not through
causal demonstration of connectedness but through a priori deference to God,
Nature, or other metaphysical `determinant'"
[[42]]
Moore D "The Effects of the Social Welfare System on Unemployment"
(1997) 23:4 Australian Bulletin of Labour 275-294: Unemployment of
migrants could be voluntary in their response to generous unemployment
benefits, high wage expectations, idleness or lack of motivation. Unemployment could also be due to the rigid
labour markets especially where workers’ union are strong.
See also: [9] Omerod P, The Death of Economics
(Faber & Faber, London 1994) ch 5. At p.126:This natural rate of
unemployment can be reduced by deregulating the labour market.
[[45]]
Sen A "Inequality, Unemployment and Contemporary Europe"
(1997) 2:136 International Labour Review at 155-171.
[[51]]
Nakkuda Ali v MF de S Jayaratne [1951] AC 66, PC; Ridge v Baldwin
[1963] 2 All ER 66 at 79, 80, 115, HL
[[52]]
Schidmt v Secretary of State of Home Affairs [1969] 1 All ER 904 at 909
and Breen v Amalgamated Engineering [1971] 1 A;; ER 1148 at 1154, CA
[[54]]
Buckley v Tutty HCA 919710 125 CLR 353; [1972]370 per Barwick C.J., Mc
Tiernan, Windeyer, Owen and Gibbs JJ.
[[58]]
Cooper v Wandsworth Board of Works {1863) 14 C.B.N.S. 180 deals with
property rights and privileges.
Erle C.J. held that no man is to be deprived of his
property without his having an opportunity of being heard.
Willes J said that the rule was of universal
application and founded on the plainest principles of justice.
Byles J said:
Although there are no positive words in a statute
requiring that the party shall be heard, yet the justice of the common law will
supply the omission of the legislature.
Willes J
said:
In condemning a man to have his house pulled down a
judicial act is as much as fining him $5.
………“From the nature of the thing done, it must be a judicial act and
justice requires that the man should be heard.”
[[60]]
Wakelin v London and South Western Rly Co (1886) 12 App Cas 41 at 45 HL;
Hill v Baxter [1958} 1 All ER 193 at 196: The clarity over which sense is relevant at any time is
essential.
[[62]]
Pickup v Tahames and Mersey Marine Insurance Co Ltd (1878) 3 QBD 594 at
599. 600 CA; Wakelin v London and South Western Rly Co (1886) 12 App
Case 41 at 45. As to submission of no
case to answer see Alexander v Rayson [1936] 1 KB 169 CA, Young v
Rank [1950] 2 KB 510, 2 All ER 166.
[[64]]
Abrath v North Eastern Railway Co (1883) 11 QBD 440 at 456, CA, per
Bowen LJ; Jayasena v R (1970) 1 All ER 219 PC.
[[65]]
Joseph Constantine SS Line Ltd v Imperial Smelting Corporation Ltd
[1941] 2 All ER, 165, Brown v Rolls Royce Ltd [1960} 1 All ER 577.
[[66]]
R v Edwards [1974] 2 All ER 1085 at 1085: What rests on the defendant is
the legal or as it s sometimes called the persuasive burden of proof and it is
not the evidential burden. But there is no general rule to this effect.
[[68]]
At 693 of Nagle v Fielden and others [1966] 1 All E R 689 where he said:
“If a man applies to join a social club and is
blackballed, he has no cause of action because the members have made no
contract with him. The can do as they
like … but we are not considering a social club. We are considering an association, which exercises a virtual
monopoly in an important field of human activity By refusing or withdrawing a licence, the stewards can put a man
out of business.”
Lord Denning further said in the same case:
“I venture to question this statement,
notwithstanding the eminence of the judge from whom it fell.. recognized that a
man has a right to work at his trade or profession without being unjustly
excluded from it. He is not to be shut
out from it at the whim of those having the governance of it. They make a rule, which enables them to
reject his application arbitrarily or capriciously, not reasonably, that rule
is bad. It is against public
policy. The courts will not give effect
to it. Such was held in the seventeenth
century in the celebrated case where a
rule was made that no person should exercise the trade of a tailor in Ipswich
unless he was admitted by them to be a sufficient workman. Lord Coke, C.J. held that the rule was bad,
because it was against the liberty and freedom of the subject. If however, the rule is reasonable, the
court will not interfere.”
[[70]]
Bagg’s Case (1615) 11 Co.Rep.93b which concerns the deprivation of the
privilege of being a Burgess of Plymouth.
[[71]]
Wood v Woad (1874) L>R. 9 Esch.190: where Kelby C.B. said: The rule…
“is not confined to the conduct of strictly legal
tribunals but is applicable to every tribunal or body of persons invested with
authority to adjudicate upon matters involving civil consequences to
individuals.”
[[72]]
In Fisher v Keane (1878) 11 Ch.D. 353 it was said:
“They ought not as I understand it according to the
ordinary rules by which justice should be administered by committees of clubs
or by any other body of person who decide upon the conduct of others to blast a
man’s reputation for ever – perhaps to ruin his prospects for life without
giving him an opportunity of either defending or palliating his conduct.”
[[73]]Finn,
Paul, Professor: “The Forgotten Trust: The People and the State” in Equity
Issues and Trends (Malcolm Cope: editor) at p.131
[[75]]
R v Boston (1923 33 CLR 386, and see also Report of the Committee of
Inquiry, Public Duty and Private Interest (AGPS, Canberra, 1979 at 126.
[[77]]
Hospital Products Ltd v United States Surgical Corporation (1984) 156
CLR 41 at 96 – 97: The six most common
categories are:
trustee and beneficiary, agent and principal, solicitor
and client, employee and employer, director and company and partners.
[[81]]
Dorsett, Shaunnagh: Comparing Apples and Oranges: the Fiduciary Principle in
Australia and Canada after Breen v Williams at p.158 to 160
[[82]]
Latimer, Paul: Australian Business Law, 14th edition, 1995, CCH Australia Ltd
at p.12 and 21.
[[84]]
Padffied v Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food [1968] AC
997. See further: Ackner, Lord, Judicial
Review - judicial creativity at its best (1987) 61 ALJ 442; Nicholson, RD, Review
of government decisions; limitations to review (1987) 61 ALJ 629.
[[85]]
Goldman, Barry M., (V54N2 Start page: 361-386, ISSN: 00315826)): Toward an
understanding of employment discrimination claiming: An integration of
organizational justice and social information processing theories: Personnel
Psychology; (Summer 2001) Durham. (Murdoch University Library)
[[86]]
Greenberg J. (1996). The quest for justice on the job: essays and
experiments. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
[[87]]
Adams JS. (1965). Inequity in Social Exchange. In Berkowitz L (Ed.), Advances
in Experimental Social Psychology (Vol. 2, pp. 267-299). New York: Academic
Press.
[[88]]
Lind EA, Tyler TR. (1988). The Social Psychology of Procedural justice.
New York: Plenum. May ML, Stengel DB. (1990): Who sues their doctors? How
patients handle medical grievances. Law and Society Review, 24, 105-120.
[[90]]
This Convention adopted on 25.6.1958 is cited as the : Discrimination (Employment and
Occupation) Convention, 1958 (ILO No. 111), 362 U.N.T.S. 31, was entered
into force June 15, 1960.
<http://www.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/n3ilo111.htm.>
[[92]]
Bendick, Marc, Jr.: International Migration: Discrimination against
racial/ethnic minorities in access to employment in the United States:
Empirical findings from situation testing: Foreword (A Study financed by
the Russell Sage Foundation, a body concerned with the integration of migrants
and ethnic minorities).
<http://www.ilo.org/public/english/protection/migrant/papers/usempir/fwd.htm.
>
[[94]]
Particularly, the Migration for Employment Convention (Revised), 1949
(No. 97); the Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention,
1958 (No. 111); the Migrant Workers (Supplementary Provisions) Convention,
1975 (No. 143); and the non-binding Recommendations supplementing
them. These types of International legal instruments
do influence national laws and regulations in such countries which ratify the binding Conventions.
[[95]]
Forty in the case of Convention No. 97, one hundred and twelve in the case of
Convention No. 111, and seventeen in the case of Convention No. 143.
[[96]]
F. Bovenkerk, M. Gras and D. Ramsoedh: Discrimination against migrant
workers and ethnic minorities in access to employment in the Netherlands
(Geneva, ILO, 1995);
A. Goldberg, D. Mourinho: 'Empirischer Nachweis
von Diskriminierung
gegenüber ausländischen Arbeitnehmern beim Zugang
zum Arbeitsmarkt', in: A. Goldberg, D. Mourinho und U. Kulke: Arbeitsmarkt-Diskriminierung
gegenüber Ausländischen Arbeitnehmern in Deutschland (Geneva, ILO, 1995; English
translation in preparation);
Colectivo IOE: 'Discriminación contra
trabajadores marroquíes en el acceso al empleo: Informe sobre España', in:
Colectivo IOE y R.
Pérez Molina: La discriminación laboral a los
trabajadores inmigrantes en España (Geneva, ILO, 1995; English translation
in preparation).